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Abstract
Tax competition in the European Union is fierce. Especially since the entry
of the new member States, tax reforms in the ”old” Europe are frequent. In this
paper we formally test the presence of strategic tax setting in the old EU15 as
a reaction to the tax rates in the new EU10 using a fiscal reaction function. We
first develop a simple model of spatial tax competition that predicts an inverse
relationship between distance and toughness of tax competition. Empirically
we find indeed that tax competition is stronger for countries relatively closer
to the low tax region of the EU10 like Germany and Austria than for old
member States further away from the new member States such as Spain, UK
and Portugal.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decade, corporate tax rates decreased in the enlarged Europe. The
average corporate tax rate in the EU25 dropped from 38.24% in 1993 to 25.77% in
2006. The introduction of the euro in 2002 and the accession of 10 new member
states in 2004 seem to have contributed to increased tax competition in the ’old’
Europe. Within the EU15, Ireland, Germany and Italy have known the largest
decrease in their corporate tax rates during the period 1993-2006. Perhaps not
surprisingly, two of these countries are ’neighbors’ of the new EU10 countries1. The
literature on FDI location decisions shows that Eastern European countries can use
corporate tax rates as an effective instrument to attract FDI (Disdier &Mayer (2004)
and Bellak & Leibrecht (2005)). As a consequence, a multinational from outside
Europe can decide to locate in a low tax country within Europe and export goods
to a high tax European country instead. Thus, EU integration may have intensified
EU tax competition between neighboring countries. Some earlier studies find that
EU15 countries set their corporate tax rates interdependent (Devereux. Lockwood
& Redoano (2002), Altshuler & Goodspeed (2002), Redoano (2003) and Ruiz &
Gerard (2007)), but none of these studies has investigated spatial tax competition
between the ’old’ EU15 and the ’new’ EU10. This is where the aim of this paper
lies: we study to what extent geographical proximity to the low tax areas of the
new EU10 members affects corporate tax rates in the former EU15 countries2.
For this purpose, we develop first a spatial tax competition model a` la Hotelling
(1929) and d’Aspremont et al. (1979) with countries competing to attract a multi-
national. The model predicts that tax competition is more intense between geo-
graphically close countries. Second, the outcome of the theoretical model is tested
1Ireland is a special case. It has a different tax rate development than the rest of Europe. Since
1997 onwards, the Irish corporate tax rate decreased tremendously and dives under the average tax
rate of the EU10.
2The EU15 includes Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, UK, France, Greece and Ireland.
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using a fiscal reaction function3. We test whether and which EU15 countries respond
to changes in the tax rates of EU10 countries. The results indicate that distance
matters for tax competition i.e. EU15 countries closer to the EU10 like Germany
and Austria are more responsive than countries further away from the EU10 such
as France, Belgium and the Netherlands.
The paper is organized as follows. First, section 2 shows some stylized facts of
corporate taxes in Europe. Section 3 reviews the related literature on tax mimicking
and section 4 develops a theoretical framework. Section 5 explains the methodology
and the data. Section 6 shows the results and 7 discusses the robustness checks.
Finally, section 8 briefly concludes our main results.
2 Corporate taxes in Europe: stylized facts
Although traditional tax competition theories predict a downward pressure on cor-
porate taxes when capital mobility increases (for an overview see Wilson (1999) and
Bretschger & Hettich (2002)), empirical studies do not find evidence of a race to
the bottom in corporate taxes (Krogstrup (2004), Baldwin & Krugman (2004), Sal-
vatore (2002), Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2007), Desai (1999), Mendoza & Tesar (2004)
and Stewart & Webb (2006)). While statutory taxes fell down in the EU, tax bases
were broadened such that tax revenues on corporate incomes remained stable (De-
vereux. Griffith & Klemm (2002), Buijinck et al. (2002) and Vandenbussche &
Crabbe´ (2006)). Previous studies investigated corporate tax rates according to the
traditional classification of EU15 and EU10 countries. In contrast, Vandenbussche
& Crabbe´ (2006) group EU15 countries in neighbors and non-neighbors of the EU10.
Ireland and the EU10 are presented separately. Neighbors are defined as countries
with a common land or water border with one or more countries of the EU10. We
3The terms fiscal reaction function, tax mimicking, spatial competition and strategic interaction
will be used as synonyms explaining the event of countries reacting to tax changes in related other
countries.
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extended their data with tax rates for 2005 and 2006. The result is presented in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Neighbors versus non-neighbors of the new EU10 members, 1993-2006
Neighbors: Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Italy and Greece; Non-neighbors:
Spain, France, UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal
Source: Vandenbussche & Crabbe´ (2006), extra data included for 2005 and 2006.
This figure confirms previous findings that the average corporate tax rate in the
EU10 is lower than in the EU15 and the gap in tax rates between the EU10 and
EU15 even increased over the period 1993-2006. In addition, Figure 1 illustrates the
fast decrease in tax rates of Ireland since 1997. As a consequence, two groups can be
distinguished: a core and a periphery. The ’core’ are the EU14 countries (neighbors
and non-neighbors) and charges an average tax rate of 30.98%, the ’periphery’ group
consists of the EU10 and Ireland with an average tax rate of 20%. This tax difference
is consistent with the theory of Baldwin & Krugman (2004) suggesting that firms in
the core are willing to pay higher tax rates in return for better infrastructure, more
high skilled labor and technological development. But the main observation from
Figure 1 is that corporate tax rates decreased much faster in the neighbors compared
to the non-neighbors of the EU10. While the average tax rate in the non-neighbors
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remained stable for a long period, the average tax rate in the neighbors decreased
rapidly and dived under the average tax rate of the non-neighbors in 2000. These
reforms could indicate that neighbors of the EU10 are subject of more intense tax
competition as a result of their geographical proximity to the low tax areas of the
EU10. The aim of this paper is to study the sharp decrease in corporate tax rates
of the neighboring countries of the EU10 as a reaction to low tax rates in the EU10
more closely.
3 Related Literature on Fiscal Reaction Functions
Generally, theoretical and empirical work point out that countries or regions do
not set their tax rate independently, but take into account the tax rates in related
countries or regions. Countries or regions do this according to two reasons: yard-
stick competition and capital tax competition. The first theory poses that voters
judge policy-makers on their performance by comparing tax rates of neighboring
countries. Therefore, politicians, to ascertain their re-election, will ‘tax mimic’ their
neighbors’ tax rate. The second theory argues that countries compete to attract
capital by setting lower tax rates. It is not always clear whether the presence of ‘tax
mimicking’ comes from yardstick or tax competition, since the empirical method for
both theories is the same (Brueckner 2003).
Empirical studies estimate a fiscal reaction function of a certain jurisdiction which
relates the tax rate of this jurisdiction to its own characteristics and to the tax
rate in competing jurisdictions. When tax rates are chosen strategically, the reac-
tion function has a nonzero slope indicating that competitors’ tax rates influence
the given jurisdiction’s choice. The sign of the slope can be positive or negative
depending on the specific parameter values. If strategic interaction is absent, the
slope of the reaction function is not significantly different from zero (Brueckner &
Saavedra 2001). This methodology has been used in many articles on local property,
business or personal taxes (Besley & Case (1995), Bordignon et al. (2002), Heyndels
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& Vuchelen (1998), Brueckner (1998), Brett & Pinkse (2000),Brueckner & Saave-
dra (2001), Carlsen et al. (2005), Buettner (2001), Ladd (1992), Allers & Elhorst
(2005), Hayashi & Boadway (2001), Allers & Elhorst (2005), etc) and government
expenditure levels (Sole´-Olle´ (2003), Figlio et al. (1999), Revelli (2003), Case et al.
(1993), Geys (2006), Baicker (2005), Werck et al. (2007), etc) across jurisdictions
within one country4.
With regard to corporate taxes, Devereux. Lockwood & Redoano (2002) argue that
yardstick competition can be eliminated as a possible explanation. The reason is
that corporate taxes are not a critical topic for voters to evaluate policy-makers,
certainly because most voters do not even know the domestic corporate tax rate.
Devereux. Lockwood & Redoano (2002) investigate strategic tax competition in
21 OECD countries in the period 1982-1999. They find that countries strategically
compete over the statutory tax rate and EATR5 and that countries with relatively
high effective tax rates react more strongly to tax rates in other countries. A second
study examining strategic tax competition between countries and the first using only
EU countries is Altshuler & Goodspeed (2002). They find that EU countries strate-
gically compete with geographically close countries using corporate tax revenues
over GDP, but not using personal income tax revenues. They also conclude that
since the US tax reform of 1986, non-tax haven EU countries compete to a lesser ex-
tent with the US in corporate tax rates. A second study using exclusively European
countries is Redoano (2003). She shows that tax competition mainly occurs between
geographically close countries using statutory tax rates for 13 European countries
during the period 1980-1995. Finally, Ruiz & Gerard (2007) find empirical evidence
of limited ‘tax mimicking’ between neighboring EU15 countries using statutory and
effective tax rates during the period 1989-2001. They argue that possible converging
tax rates in the EU15 can explain their weaker result of spatial tax competition.
4See Brueckner (2003) for an overview of empirical studies on strategic interaction
5EATR= effective average tax rate calculated using the forward looking method, see Devereux.
Griffith & Klemm (2002).
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This paper will extend the limited number of studies using fiscal reaction functions
on exclusively European Union countries. In particular, the impact of changes in
the tax rates of the EU10 on tax rates of the EU15 will be the focus. Furthermore,
different definitions of neighbors will be used to gain insights in the spatial tax
competition process in the EU25 during the period 1993-2006.
4 Theory
In the classic Hotelling (1929) model, two ice-cream sellers choose their location on
the beach in order to maximize their sales. Each consumer buys one unit of ice
cream based on the price and the cost of transporting the good home. d’Aspremont
et al. (1979) improved this model and came to the conclusion that each ice-cream
seller gains from moving away as far as possible from the other. Extending the
intuition arising from their results on competition between firms to competition
between countries suggests an inverse relation between distance and toughness of
tax competition.
Figure 2: Spatial tax competition: a theoretical framework
In our model two countries A and B are located on a fixed distance x from each other
as illustrated in Figure 2. We assume that there is only one firm, a multinational
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that does not compete with the domestic firms. This firm will have two location
options. Either it locates in country A and produces for the domestic market, or
it sets up in country B where it will produce for the market of both countries. In
the latter case, the firm will need to pay a transportation cost to export the goods
to country A. This transportation cost, c, is quadratic related to the distance x:
cx2 so that the transportation cost becomes more expensive for longer distances6
(d’Aspremont et al. 1979). The reason why the multinational wants to sell to country
A whatever location is chosen, is that the relevant market for its products is in
country A. Consumers in country A have a higher demand for the products, for
example welfare in country A is higher and the multinational sells luxury products.
This assumption is translated in a larger market size for country A than for country
B (M >> m). A final assumption is that set up costs and production costs are the
same in both locations, therefore they will not affect the location decision of the
firm and can be dropped from the analysis. The order of events is as follows.
• Stage 1: the government of country A will set its tax rate.
• Stage 2: the multinational makes its location decision.
• Stage 3: the multinational sells to maximize its profits.
We solve the model backwards, introducing additional formal notation as required7.
To simplify things we assume that the corporate tax rate in country B is fixed.
Moreover it is not essential for the aim of this model, namely the impact of distance
between countries on the tax rate of country A. In stage 3, the multinational sells a
certain output to maximize its profits. Using the demand functions of both countries
A and B
PA = (M −QA) (1)
PB = (m−QB),
6We can relax this assumption and include a linear transportation cost cx. This will not change
our outcome.
7The detailed computations are described in Appendix.
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the after-tax profit of the multinational is:
piA = (M −QA)QA(1− tA) (2)
piB = [(m−QB)QB + (M −QAB)QAB − cx2QAB](1− tB)
where tA (tB) is the corporate tax rate of country A (B) and 0< tA(tB) <1.
The equilibrium output and after-tax profits in A or B are respectively
A : Q∗A =
M
2
(3)
pi∗A =
M2
4
(1− tA)
and
B : Q∗B =
m
2
and Q∗AB =
M − cx2
2
(4)
pi∗B = (1− tB)(
m2
4
+M
M − cx2
2
− (M − cx
2)2
4
− cxM − cx
2
2
)
The second stage deals with the firm’s location decision. The multinational will be
indifferent in its location preference when its after-tax profit in country A equals
the after-tax profit it could earn in country B. This is when the tax rate of country
A equals
pi∗A = pi
∗
B (5)
⇒ t∗A = −(1− tB)(
m2 + (M − cx2)2
M2
) + 1
This equilibrium tax rate is among others a function of the tax rate of country B,
market size, transport cost and distance x.
The outcome of the second stage leads to two options for country A’s tax rate.
Country A can set its tax rate below or above t∗A. Both options result in a different
welfare function for country A. We assume that the welfare function of country A
consists of consumer surplus (CS), and tax income. Since a multinational is usually
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foreign owned, after-tax profits will be shifted abroad and do not enter the welfare
function of country A. Including the firm’s after-tax profits into the welfare function
would not change our basic result, on the contrary it would strengthen the outcome.
But it makes the algebra simpler. The welfare function can be written as follows
WA = CS + tA
pi∗A
1− tA (6)
If country A chooses for option 1 and sets a tax rate lower than t∗A, then the multi-
national will find country A more attractive and locates in A. Country A will receive
tax incomes from taxing the firm’s profit. On the other hand, if country A chooses
to set its tax rate above t∗A (option 2), then the firm will find country B a better
location to produce and export to country A. As a consequence, country A looses
its tax income and consumer surplus will be lower than in the first option due to
transport costs.
This argument can be summarized as follows
tA < t
∗
A ⇒ WA = CS1 + tA
piA∗
1− tA (7)
OR
tA > t
∗
A ⇒ WA = CS2
Since country A wants to maximize its welfare, the optimal tax rate of country A
will be just below t∗A.
This brings us to the main question in this paper, namely how will distance between
two countries influence the tax rate of country A. Deriving the optimal tax rate for
country A with respect to distance x leads us to the following equation
∂tA
∂x
= (1− tB)(4cxM − 4c
2x3
M2
) (8)
which will be positive as long as the market size of country A is larger than the
transport cost (M > cx2). This indicates that countries closer to country B will
set lower taxes as long as the domestic market is large enough. This aspect of the
model seems to suggest that market size or the level of development plays a role as
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well. Hence, in the empirical framework we will test for the level of development by
using GDP per capita. Assuming that country A is a member of the EU15 countries
and country B is an example of the EU10 countries, the outcome of the theoretical
model can be summarized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION: EU15 countries closer to the new EU10 member states expe-
rience more tax competition from the EU10.
5 Methodology and Data
To test this theoretical proposition empirically, a fiscal reaction function for the
EU15 countries is estimated. As explained in section 3, a fiscal reaction function
has a nonzero slope when countries strategically react to tax rates in other countries.
We investigate the interaction between the EU15 and EU10 countries for the period
1993-2006.
TAXiEU15,t = β0 + β1TAXiEU15,t−1 + β2(
∑
i6=j
wijTAXjEU10) (9)
+β3Xi,t + αi + δt + εit
In the above expression (9), the dependent variable TAX is the statutory tax rate
of country i in the EU158 at time t9. On the right hand side, the model includes
the lagged dependent TAX variable, the weighted tax rate of the 10 new member
states10 (wijTAXjEU10), a set of country control variables (X)11 such as population
8EU15= Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, UK, Ireland,
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Italy and Greece
9All data on corporate tax rates are collected for the period 1993-2006 from KPMG (2006)’s tax
surveys and were available for 1993-2006.
10Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Malta and
Cyprus
11The control variables, population density and GDP per capita are collected from the world de-
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density, GDP per capita and the lagged personal income tax rate, country fixed
effects (αi) and time dummies (δt).
The weighted EU10 tax rates is our main variable of interest. This variable is the
weighted sum of the statutory corporate tax rates of the new EU10 member states:
(wSTR)it =
∑
j 6=i
wijSTRjt
∀i :
∑
j
wij = 1
(10)
For the weight, different measures from the theory will be used. According to Besley
& Case (1995), spatial models typically use geographical weights for 2 reasons. First,
geographic neighbors are likely to experience similar shocks and therefore neighbors’
tax rates are more informative than tax rates in far away districts. A second reason
is that information about policy decisions in nearby countries spreads quicker. The
main weighing scheme that we will use is the inverse distance between the EU15 and
EU10 countries. In addition, four other weighing schemes will be used to gain insight
in the EU15 tax competition game. The most widely used definition of neighbors is
contiguity. In this definition the weight wij equals 1 if country i has a common land
or water border with country j and 0 otherwise. A third spatial weight is based
on the idea that also neighbors of second order can be affected by changes in the
corporate tax rates of the EU10 countries. In this case, wij equals 1 if country i is
a second neighbor of country j and 0 otherwise. Finally, two non-distance related
weighing schemes will be used. The first is the lagged share of exports from country
i to country j in the total exports of country i. The second non-distance weighing
scheme is the inverse difference in gdp per capita between country i and j12. All
weights are normalized so that their sum equals 1.
Due to possible correlation between country fixed effects and the lagged dependent
velopment indicators (WDI), while the personal income tax rate is available in the OECD database
until 2004
12The distances are selected from the CEPII distance measures, export shares are calculated from
Eurostat and GDP per capita is collected from World Development Indicators (WDI).
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variable in the estimation of equation (9), we need to take first differences in order
to get rid of this correlation13. Equation (9) can consequently be rewritten as:
∆TAXiEU15,t = β0 + β1TAXiEU15,t−1 + β2∆(
∑
i 6=j
wijTAXjEU10) (11)
+β3∆Xi,t + εit
A second econometric issue is the possible endogeneity of the weighted tax rates of
the EU10. To solve this problem, the instrumental variables method is frequently
applied in the fiscal reaction literature since it is easier to implement than maximum
likelihood (Brueckner (2003) and Allers & Elhorst (2005)). As an instrumental vari-
able, the endogenous variable can be lagged by one or more periods. Another typical
procedure under the IV approach in the spatial lag model is to regress each country
i’s neighbor tax rates
∑
i 6=j wijTAXjEU10i on
∑
i 6=j wijXi 6=j and Xi
14. The fitted
values, ̂
∑
i6=j wijTAXjEU10i are then used as instruments for the weighted EU10 tax
rates in equation (11) (Brueckner (2003), Altshuler & Goodspeed (2002), Redoano
(2003), Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), Brett & Pinkse (2000), Carlsen et al. (2005),
Sole´-Olle´ (2003), Figlio et al. (1999), Revelli (2002), Ladd (1992), Buettner (2003),
Geys (2006), Baicker (2005), Werck et al. (2007) and Allers & Elhorst (2005)). We
will use this approach in the estimations.
6 Results
Table 1 reports the estimation results of equation (11). Columns (1) to (3) use OLS,
while in all other estimations the weighted EU10 tax rates are instrumented with
the fitted value of the approach explained in section 5. First, Column (1) reports the
reaction function for the whole EU25. The slope of the reaction function is positive
13Time dummies are also not included anymore, since the variables are in first differences and
the regressions already control for GDP fluctuations.
14X=population density, gdp per capita, lagged personal income tax rate
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and significant indicating that spatial tax competition among EU25 countries is
present and confirms results from previous papers on spatial tax competition in
the EU15. The aim of this paper is to dig deeper than previous papers and study
the interaction between the old EU15 and the new EU10. Column (2) shows the
reaction function for the EU15 with respect to the EU10 tax rates and column (3)
excludes Ireland as a special case (EU14). The spatial interaction is only significant
in column (3) for the EU14 (Ireland excluded), suggesting that Ireland is indeed an
outlier. This result suggests that EU15 countries closer to the EU10 low tax areas
such as Denmark and Austria, react to the EU10 tax rates. In order to gain more
insight in this interaction, columns (3) and (4) split up the EU14 into neighboring
and non-neighboring countries of the EU10. The neighboring countries are those
countries with a common land or water border such as Finland, Sweden, Denmark,
Germany, Italy, Greece and Austria. The non-neighboring countries do not have
a common border: Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, UK, Belgium, Luxembourg and
France. A comparison of both results shows that the weighted EU10 tax rate is only
significant in column (3). In other words, only neighbors of the EU10 for example
Denmark, Austria, Germany react to changes in the tax rate of the new EU1015.
More concrete, a 10% decrease in the tax rate of the EU10, decreases the tax rate of
the neighbors of the EU10 by 21%. This could explain why Ruiz & Gerard (2007)
find only weak tax competition among EU15 countries.
Two country control variables in estimations in Table 1 are significant at conven-
tional confidence levels. First, countries with higher incomes, as measured by GDP
per capita, have higher corporate tax rates. This is consistent with the litera-
ture that a higher country income is related to higher demands for public services
and thus higher corporate tax rates to finance these public services (Altshuler &
Goodspeed 2002). Second, also consistent with the literature suggesting that tax
competition will lead to a movement away from taxes on mobile factors toward taxes
15Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Malta, Cyprus and
Hungary
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Table 1: Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU25 EU15 EU14 EU14 IV EU7 IV EU7 IV
non-neighb
STRlagi,t−1 0.56*** 0.8*** 0.58*** 0.64*** 0.58*** 0.8***
(0.085) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15)
WijTaxEU10j,t 0.47*** 0.01 0.14** 0.14* 0.21* 0.13
(0.2) (0.15) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.1)
WijTaxEU7j,t - - - - -0.66
(1.02)
GDP per capitait 0.0 -0.0002 0.001* 0.001*** 0.0* 0.0
(0.0) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0) (0.001)
inctaxi,t−1 -0.48*** -0.12*** -0.44*** -0.29** -0.61*** -0.14
(0.14) (0.05) (0.13) (0.14) (0.24) (0.16)
pop densityit 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.68 0.04
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.55) (0.08)
constant -0.34*** -0.07 -0.44*** -0.96*** -0.49 -0.06
(0.31) (0.18) (0.18) (0.32) (0.34) (0.35)
Nobs 119 168 154 104 70 48
serial correlation 1order test 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
serial correlation 2order test 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.08 0.6 0.15
Sargan test 0.02 0.89 1
The estimations are in first differences and the EU10 tax rates are distance weighted. Column (1)
uses the tax rates of the EU25 countries, column (2) uses the tax rates of the EU15, while column
(3) excludes Ireland. From column (4) onwards the weighted tax rates are instrumented. In column
(5) the tax rates of only the neighbors of the EU10 are used as dependent variable. Column (5)
uses tax rates of the non-neighbors of the EU10 as a dependent variable. Standard errors are in
parentheses. note:***,** and * denote significance level of estimates at respectively 10, 5 and 1
percent levels.
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on immobile factors (Altshuler & Goodspeed (2002), Wilson (1999)), the coefficient
on the lagged personal tax rate is negative and significant. This indicates that a
lower personal income tax rate might be compensated by a higher corporate tax
rate.
7 Robustness checks
Table 2 reports some robustness checks of the previous results. The first column
tests the reaction function of the neighbors of the EU10 with respect to changes in
the tax rates of the EU10 and the non-neighbors of the EU10. Column (2) estimates
the reaction function of the non-neighbors of the EU10 with respect to changes in
the tax rates of the EU10 and the neighbors of the EU10. The result indicates
that neighboring countries of the EU10 such as Italy and Germany do not react to
changes in the tax rates of other EU15 countries such as UK and Spain, but only
to changes in the tax rates of the EU10.
Finally, the fiscal reaction function for the EU14 (Ireland excluded) in column (3)
includes a trend to control for shocks in the EU14. But this trend is not significant
and does not change previous results.
In addition, Table 3 presents the results for the fiscal reaction function of the EU14
(Ireland excluded) using different weights of the EU10 tax rates. Column (1) uses
the contingency weight, while the weight in column (2) equals 1 if the EU14 country
is a second order neighbor of one of the EU10 countries. In column (3) the EU10
tax rates are weighted with the lagged export shares and in column (4) with gdp per
capita. For all of these weights we fail to find significant reactions of the EU14 to
changes in the EU10 tax rates. This suggests that distance is more important for tax
competition in the EU14. Finally, column (5) estimates the fiscal reaction function
of effective tax rates of the neighbors of the EU10, but does not show significant
interaction. This is in contrast with Devereux. Lockwood & Redoano (2002) who
find that 21 OECD countries compete over the STR and ETR during 1982-1999.
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Table 2: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3)
EU7 EU7 EU14
STRlagi,t−1 0.61*** 0.57*** 0.63***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.08)
Weu10jTaxj,t 0.24* 0.36** 0.15*
(0.15) (0.17) (0.08)
Weu7non−neigh.jTaxj,t -0.28 - -
(0.42)
Weu15jTaxj,t - -0.74 -
(0.46)
GDP per capitait 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
inctaxi,t−1 -0.10 -0.09 -0.28**
(0.19) (0.18) (0.14)
pop densityit -0.15 -0.34 -0.02
(0.77) (0.73) (0.11)
trend - - -0.007
(0.05)
constant -1.56** -1.64*** -0.97***
(0.19) (0.71) (0.32)
Nobs 56 56 104
serial correlation 1order test 0.00 0.0 0.00
serial correlation 2order test 0.31 0.33 0.08
Sargan test 1 1 0.02
The estimations are in first differences and all spatial variables are instrumented and distance
weighted. Column (1) tests the reaction function of the neighbors of the EU10 with respect to
changes in the tax rates of the EU10 and the non-neighbors of the EU10. Column (2) estimates
the reaction function of the non-neighbors of the EU10 with respect to changes in the tax rates
of the EU10 and the neighbors of the EU10. Column (3) includes a trend. Standard errors are
in parentheses. note:***,** and * denote significance level of estimates at respectively 10, 5 and 1
percent levels.
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Table 3: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EU14 EU14 EU14 EU14 EU7 etr
STRlagi,t−1 0.73*** 0.19 0.66*** 0.7*** 0.4***
(0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11)
WFONeu10jTaxj,t 0.17
(0.11)
WSONeu10jTaxj,t 0.15
(0.18)
Wexportt−1eu10jTaxj,t 2.44e-08
(1.83e-06)
Wgdp per capitaeu10jTaxj,t 0.014
(0.02)
Wdisteu10jETRj,t 0.00
(0.00)
GDP per capitait 0.001 0.001 0.0004 -0.07
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.1)
inctaxi,t−1 -0.36*** -0.6 -0.31*** -0.42*** 0.002
(0.15) (0.39) (0.12) (0.17) (0.004)
pop densityit -0.03 0.17 0.07 0.07 -0.01
(0.11) (0.23) (0.12) (0.08) (0.01)
constant -0.51* -1.46** -0.54*** -0.36*** 0.01
(0.29) (0.72) (0.17) (0.09) (0.01)
Nobs 108 41 141 128 63
serial correlation 1order test 0.00 0.1 0.00 0.00 0.00
serial correlation 2order test 0.07 0.8 0.29 0.52 0.65
Sargan test 0.99 0.9 0.85 0.71 0.99
The estimations are in first differences. Standard errors are in parentheses. The weighted EU10
tax rate in column (1) uses a weight equal to 1 if the EU14 country i shares a common land or
water border with EU10 country j and 0 otherwise. In column (2) the weight wij equals 1 if EU14
country i is a second order neighbor of EU10 country j, 0 otherwise. In column (3) EU10 tax rates
are weighted with export from EU14 to EU10 country as a lagged share of total export. Column
(4) uses a gdp per capita weight. Column (5) estimates the reaction function for the ETRs of the
neighbors of the EU10. note:***,** and * denote significance level of estimates at respectively 10,
5 and 1 percent levels.
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8 Conclusion
During the past decade the ’old EU15 decreased its average corporate tax level by
10%. Besides Ireland, Germany and Italy experienced the largest decrease in their
tax rates. Not surprisingly, both countries are neighbors of the ‘new’ EU10. The
aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of distance to the low tax EU10-countries
on corporate tax rates in the EU15 during the period 1993-2006. To our knowledge,
this is the first paper studying the impact of the new EU member states on the tax
rates of the old EU member states.
First, a spatial competition model is developed to predict the role of distance in tax
competition. In this model a multinational makes its location decision between two
countries taking into account the corporate tax rates, market size and transport cost.
The outcome of the model suggests that tax competition is more intense between
countries at a close distance. Second, this result is empirically tested for the EU15
during the period 1993-2006 using a fiscal reaction function. The results show that
the low tax rates of the EU10-countries are the main driver of tax competition in
the EU25. But only neighbors of the EU10 seem to react to low taxes of the EU10
in setting their own corporate tax rate. Moreover, we verified that these neighbors
of the EU10 react far less to changes in the tax rate of other EU15 countries. To
put it differently, the corporate tax rate of a country like Germany or Denmark
seems to respond to changes in the tax rate of the EU10 like Czech Republic, but
will respond much less to the tax rate of for example Belgium. When using other
definitions of neighbors we failed to find spatial tax competition.
The resulting spatial dimension of tax competition in this paper will also have
implications for transfer pricing. Since we find that neighbors of Eastern Europe
are subject to more intense tax competition, tax differences between these countries
will become smaller. As a consequence smaller tax differences are likely to induce
less profit shifting towards Eastern Europe. In addition, smaller tax differentials will
also stimulate decentralization choices of multinationals as pointed out by Nielsen
19
et al. (2007).
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9 Appendix A
The computations of the model in section 4 in more detail:
Stage 3
Using the demand functions in (1), the after-tax profits in country A and B are
respectively
piA = (M −QA)QA(1− tA) (12)
piB = [(m−QB)QB + (M −QAB)QAB − cx2QAB](1− tB)
Maximizing these expressions leads to the equilibrium output and after-tax profits
in (4) and (3). The maximization is as follows
∂piA
∂QA
= (1− tA)(M −QA −QA) = 0⇒ Q∗A =
M
2
(13)
and
∂piB
∂QB
= (1− tB)(M −QB −QB) = 0⇒ Q∗B =
M
2
∂piB
∂QAB
= (1− tB)(M −QA −QA − cx2) = 0⇒ QAB = M − cx
2
2
Stage 2
Proof of the optimal tax rate t∗A in (5):
pi∗A = pi
∗
B (14)
M2
4
(1− tA) = (1− tB)(M
2
4
+ 2
M − cx2
M
− (M − cx
2)2
M2
)
−2cx2M − cx
2
M2
tA = −(1− tB)(m
2 + (M − cx2)2
M2
+ 1
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Figure 3: Map of EU25
EU10 (red)= Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia
first order neighbors (blue)= Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Italy and Greece
second order neighbors (green)= Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Italy, Greece, Finland,
Netherlands, Belgium and France
third order neighbors (yellow)=UK, Spain, Portugal
Fourth order neighbor (purple)=Ireland
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